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Abstract 
 
Over the past ten years many industries have experienced a wave of mergers 
and acquisitions. The enthusiasm in consolidation is based on the belief that 
gains can accumulate through expense reduction, increased market power, and 
scale of economies. Whether or not a merged company achieves the expected 
performance is the critical question.  Measuring the success of a merger 
depends on several factors, including which aspect of postmerger performance 
being measured and how success or failure is defined.  
  
In this thesis, we attempt to investigate and evaluate the impact of mergers on 
corporate performance and stock prices by studying cases of two erstwhile 
Sweden based pharmaceutical companies. It is our intention to examine any 
changes in the firms’ profitability and overall financial performance from 
premerger through to postmerger periods and find out if the mergers created 
or destroyed shareholder value.  
 
Generally, the standard financial measures in our cases gave positive results. 
Sales, key ratios and other performance measures showed an increasing trend. 
Share prices of AstraZeneca showed an increasing trend thoughout the periods, 
while that of PharmaciaUpjohn was u-shaped. Dividends paid to Swedish 
shareholders increased significantly in both merger cases. 
 
We recommend further research using other measures of performance than 
those we have used.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. Background 
 
 
Merging a business is one of the most complex strategic moves a company can 
make. The potential rewards are many—mergers can contribute to growth by 
broadening product lines, increasing market share, strengthening financial 
position, stabilising a cyclical or seasonal business, and providing key 
executive or technical talent. 
 
These potential benefits are even further enhanced in cross-border mergers. 
Cross-border mergers occur when a company in one country merges with a 
company in another country. These mergers offer advantages such as rapid 
penetration of new markets, economies of scale, and diversification, to mention 
only a few, that are critically important to businesses seeking to compete and 
thrive and often cannot be achieved in any other way. In the 1990s, a gigantic 
merger wave gripped the world economy. In 1999 alone, the United Nations 
Commission on Trade and Development reported that the value of cross-border 
mergers & acquisitions reached nearly US$700 billion.1 This figure gives an 
indication of the potential benefits perceived to accrue from such mergers.  
 
Successful competition in international markets may depend on capabilities 
obtained in a timely and efficient fashion through mergers. Some have argued 
that mergers increase value and efficiency and move resources to their highest 
and best uses; thereby increasing shareholder value (Jenson 1984). Others are 
sceptical. They argue that the companies acquired are already efficient and that 
their subsequent performance after acquisition is not improved (Magenheim & 
Muller 1998). Others prove that the gains to shareholders merely represent a 
redistribution away from labour and other stakeholders (Shleifer and Summers 
1988)2. 
                                                 
1 Michael Cronin   
2 Weston et al 
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According to Angwin and Sawill (1997), cross-border mergers seem to be 
slightly more successful, apparently especially in Europe. They speculate that 
cultural and geographical distance might have a positive effect, due possibly to 
less parent company interference. Cross-border acquisitions tend to be more 
close to the core area of business for the companies and, thus, less risky. 
 
Though cross-border mergers may seem smart, beneficial and easy, looking just 
at their associated benefits, some analysts believe that they never come without 
headaches, often big enough to outbalance the benefits.  
 
Porter (1990) invoked European companies ‘to compete and not collaborate’ 
with too many cross-border mergers or strategic alliances. He hinted that the 
benefits of the 1992 single market were most likely to be gained ‘if competition 
is encouraged and collusive behaviour curtailed’. According to him, the trend 
towards alliances and cross-border mergers will not make firms more 
competitive as ‘dominant firms, or ones caught in a web of links with rivals, 
will not innovate and upgrade. Supposed efficiencies from mergers will prove 
elusive in practice. Companies depending on collaborative activity will become 
mired in problems of co-ordination’.3 
 
The results of a recent study from the consulting firm, KPMG, showed that 
contrary to conventional wisdom, almost all cross- border mergers or 
acquisitions fail to deliver proper value to shareholders. The study revealed 
further that fifty-three percent of cross-border arrangements between 1996 and 
1998 actually destroyed shareholder value, while about a third resulted in no 
enhancement whatsoever. The findings are based on the top 700 cross-border 
deals during the period reviewed. According to the study, although cross-border 
mergers or acquisitions are commonly thought to allow the new business entity 
to cut costs and increase efficiency, the companies involved spent a great deal 
of time, resources and energy on such issues as due diligence, selecting a 
management team and resolving cultural issues.4   
 
                                                 
3  Porter, M.E., (1990) 
4 Look Before You Merge  
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Merger activity in the European pharmaceutical industry appears to be heating 
up. The pharmaceutical industry is an important contributor to industrial 
development and employment growth in the global economy and has witnessed 
a trend toward consolidation during recent years. Until pharmaceutical 
companies are able to come up with breakthrough research, they have to find 
other sources for earnings growth in the meantime. One way of doing this is 
through mergers. In the past two years alone, drug companies put together 
some $60 billion worth of major mergers and acquisitions.5 Part of the effort to 
gain scale and efficiency involves the rationalisation of company operations on 
a global basis. Company activities in both primary and secondary markets have 
been affected.  
 
The investment case for the large European drug companies is compelling. This 
business has high growth rate potential due to advances in biotechnology and 
genetic research and an ageing population. New government regulations are 
reducing the times required to bring new drug products to market. Finally, the 
barriers to entry protecting the large drug makers are steep. New entrants face 
formidable difficulties in staffing and assembling a competent research 
organisation and few companies can afford the billions of dollars required 
annually to fund such research. 
 
The pharmaceutical industry is one of the leading industries in Europe. Due to 
the unique nature of the industry, where national governments are the main 
purchasers of pharmaceutical products, the industry must maintain a delicate 
balance between the desire for profits and cost containment measures imposed 
by those governments. The rising cost of research and development has 
increased the cost of innovative drugs and imposed added pressure on their 
ability to market them in the European Union. This is in stark contrast to the 
United States’ pharmaceutical industry, where no restrictions or cost 
containment measures are imposed on this sector. Mergers, a major factor in 
both markets, have slowed employment and affected growth in general. The 
opening up of markets such as Eastern Europe and Latin America should 
contribute heavily to company growth in Europe.  
 
                                                 
5 www.time.com 
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According to a Business Communications Co Inc., study of the European 
Pharmaceutical Industry, the European pharmaceutical market was expected to 
account for nearly 40% of global production with sales of about $101.5 million 
(USD) in 2000. Growing at an AAGR (average annual growth rate) of 8.1%, 
this sector is expected to total $150 million by 2005. The increase is due to 
European Single Market Convergence, which will provide competition 
incentives. The United States’ pharmaceutical market is expected to grow at an 
AAGR of 12.3% during the 5-year forecast period. Even though Europe's share 
of the total market will fall to 35% by 2005, both the United States’ and 
European markets will benefit by the rising ranks of the elderly, as well as 
intensified global research and development.  
 
Europe's pharmaceuticals companies are locked in a high stakes multi-billion 
dollar struggle with their American rivals to stay in business beyond the first 
decade of the twenty-first century. The drugs sector on both sides of the 
Atlantic is caught up in a frenzy of take-over activity as companies seek 
economies of scale to finance spiralling research and development budgets.  
 
The world-wide squeeze on health expenditure in the 1990’s and the growth in 
the costs of developing new drugs has led to a series of large-scale cross-border 
mergers followed by rationalization and redundancies which have left most 
European countries without a wholly-owned major pharmaceutical company. 
 
Sweden, which prior to 1993 had very little foreign participation in investment, 
experienced a net inflow of direct investment for the first time in 25 years. 
Foreign investment in Sweden amounted to SEK 50 billion (USD 7 billion) in 
1994 and increased to almost SEK 100 billion in 1995.2 The bulk of this was 
from mergers and acquisitions. There were a series of reforms in the late 1980s 
that can be said to have prepared the ground for this. The most significant 
changes being the abolition of currency exchange controls, elimination of 
restrictions on foreign acquisition of Swedish companies, and of clauses in 
corporate by-laws that limited foreign stock ownership. There was also a major 
tax reform in 1991 that reduced the corporate tax rate to 28 percent.   
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For the last fifty years, the chemical industry in Sweden outstripped most other 
major domestic industries in its rate of growth. Production has increased most 
rapidly in organic chemicals and plastics. The pharmaceutical industry has been 
the most successful sub-sector of the chemical industry.  Due to the rapid 
globalisation of the industry in the 1990s, most of the chemical industries are  
foreign owned today.  
 
 
1.2. The Statement of the Problem 
 
 
Globalisation and the need for consolidation has resulted in companies merging 
to ensure that they are better placed and prepared to compete more effectively. 
A list of reasons is advanced to support these mergers, which seem very 
logical, at least from the onset. 
 
Since the beginning of the 1990’s, Sweden has experienced increased cross- 
border merger activities. Among the most popular of these were two mergers in 
the pharmaceuticals industry, namely the Pharmacia/ Upjohn and Astra/Zeneca 
mergers. 
 
The potential benefits expected from these mergers include the ability of the 
companies to cut costs in order to fund more research and, hence, find new 
products, consolidate research departments to enhance efficiency and speed up 
the development of new drugs, cut down costs of operations, and make better 
use of excess manufacturing capacity.  
 
Some past research, however, seems to paint a rather gloomy picture of 
mergers. Despite the number and size of headline-making merger deals in 
recent years and the glaring advantages, a significant body of research indicates 
that the success rate of mergers and acquisitions, both domestic and cross-
border, is not very high.  
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It is no secret to corporate executives and policy makers that  carrying out a 
merger strategy is a decision fraught with risk. In addition to the more typical 
business uncertainties (competition, pricing volatility, product obsolescence), 
companies face additional risks as operating risk, overpayment risk and, of 
course, financial risk. 
 
This thesis intends to explore the profitability and value created for the 
shareholders of two erstwhile Swedish companies, AstraZeneca and 
PharmaciaUpjohn, as a result of the mergers. The two companies products are 
the biggest selling in the Swedish market (appendix 2). 
 
 
1.3. The Objectives of the Study 
 
 
The main objectives of this thesis are to investigate and evaluate the post-
integration financial and operational performance of and value creation in the 
two biggest cross-border mergers in Sweden’s pharmaceutical industry.  
Specifically, we would look at the following issues: 
 
 We examine the companies operational and financial results to determine 
if they are favourable after integration, and consistent with its reputation as the 
most successful sub-sector of the chemical industry in Sweden. 
 
 Also, we analyze how the companies’ values changed after the mergers 
and determine whether the mergers created the expected value for shareholders, 
reflected in the share prices and dividends. 
 
 
1.4. Significance of the Study 
 
This thesis is intends to provide information for: 
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 Investors, on the measures to look for in assessing the merger 
performance, the profitability and returns to be expected, and to aid them in 
investment decision-making. 
 
 Corporate management, on what to take into account when making 
cross-border mergers or acquisitions, and to aid them in evaluating alternative 
policy proposals and their impact on their companies. 
 
 Students (researching similar or related topics) and the general public, as 
it will serve as vital reference material on the profitability and value creation 
resulting from the cross-border mergers in the Swedish pharmaceutical 
industry, adding to the list of empirical literature on the subject of study.  
 
 
1.5. Methodology 
 
 
In this section, we present the methodology used in our thesis. The research 
strategy, research and data collection methods used during the research are 
described here. We also make an effort to evaluate the quality of the offered 
research, according to two logical tests by Yin (1994):    
• Validity 
• Reliability 
 
Research Strategy 
 
In choosing a research strategy from the experimentation, survey, archival 
analysis, histories and case study strategies (Yin, 1994), we came to the 
conclusion that the case study method augmented by quantitative analysis 
would be the best approach to use for the purposes of this study. This is due to 
the fact that this method is best able to explore and estimate the postmerger 
performance as  “a case study design can be used to gain an in-depth 
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understanding of the situation”.7 This method is preferred when examining the 
present-day events within their real-life situation.  
 
Research Method Selection 
 
A case study can be both quantitative and qualitative (Yin, 1994, p.14). 
Quantitative analysis is more formal and structured, while the qualitative 
method is engaged when a total perspective is required, or when a lot of 
information about a few units is needed.8 Qualitative studies make use of 
mainly an inductive research strategy. Words, rather than numbers, are used as 
an explanation. Quantitative studies are expressed in numbers but can also be 
quantitatively analyzed. The qualitative approach is the most appropriate for 
our case study, whereas a quantitative approach is suitable for the merger 
results’ assessment.    
 
Data Collection 
 
All data collected in the research process can be divided into two general types: 
primary and secondary. Primary data is gathered through interviews or surveys. 
Secondary data is investigated and published by other researchers in this field. 
We use secondary data as information sources. While exploring and assessing 
our case study we use internal data, available from the companies brochures 
and other publications, and external data, collected from trade association data, 
various books, journals, and world-wide net.  
 
Scientific Evaluation 
 
(i) Errors 
 
When evaluating the research findings possible errors in measuring and 
analysing of performance results should be taken in consideration.  We cannot 
say that the profitability data used here is free of error or bias. Accounting data 
(like stock price data) is imperfect.  They have well-known shortages. With or 
                                                 
7 Marriam, 1997, p.19 
8 Marriam, 1997, p.6 
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without merger revaluations, what corporate financial reports say about 
profitability can be affected by the choice of accounting policies (e.g. 
depreciation, stock valuation etc.) Inflation has tended to systematically make 
assets’ book values understate market or replacement values. This phenomenon 
increases the more capital-intensive and slowly growing an entity’s operations 
are. More about the probable errors - in the  chapter 2, section 2.1.4 “Using 
financial accounting data”. 
 
 
 (ii) Validity 
 
Basically validity concerns whether the developed framework is a relevant 
representation of reality. The problem of validity is a common problem in 
research of this kind. A data-collection instrument is considered valid if it is 
free from systematic and random errors. 
 
Construct validity states that a correct theoretical framework is being linked to 
the problems and the results of study. To improve the construct validity a chain 
of evidence can be established in order to validate the case study. To get better 
construct validity in this thesis we use multiple sources of data collection. We 
can say that the level of validity is rather high, because a lot of information was 
gathered to ensure validity as larger as possible.    
 
 
 (iii)Reliability 
 
Reliability is concerned with the consistency and accuracy of the results. It 
refers to the extent to which the measurement process is free from random 
errors. An investigation with good reliability is not affected by who conducts it 
or by the surroundings. To some extent, the research is reliable if other 
researchers obtain the same results. In order to check the reliability of our thesis 
we compared our findings to other researchers’ results and to secondary data.   
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1.6. Organisation of the Thesis 
 
 
This thesis is divided in five chapters. Chapter One describes the background, 
objectives, relevance and methodology used in this thesis. In the second 
chapter, we present the theoretical framework for the empirical study. Further, 
the methodology of the empirical study is outlined and discussed. Chapter 
Three comprises a presentation of the merger cases (historical background) and 
in Chapter Four, we analyze the findings and make comparisons between the 
two companies. In Chapter Five, we present our conclusions regarding the 
success or failure of mergers and give suggestions for further study. 
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2. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
 
 
In this chapter we make the reader familiar with the concept of mergers, the 
motives behind them, and the different approaches that have been taken in 
research in order to evaluate the mergers. Also, we make him aware of previous 
theoretical and empirical studies, and raise the problem of financial accounting 
data. 
 
 
2.1. Theoretical Studies 
 
Theoretical work suggests that at least 70 percent of mergers and acquisitions 
fail. This is being proved by many corporations in today’s business. So why do 
they fail? The argument is that most deals produce poorer shareholder value as 
merged entities than they did when they were separate. The promised synergy 
and cost savings don’t materialize, the distraction hurts effectiveness in the 
market, customers are lost, and key staff get frustrated and leave. These 
damaging side effects are not what were expected when the analysis prior to the 
merger showed how well the organizations fit together and how their combined 
strengths would make a major, positive impact in the marketplace. 
 
Why Do Mergers Occur? 
 
The simplest explanation for the occurrence of mergers must be that both 
companies consider themselves to be better off with from the merger 
transaction than without it. However, this is not a full answer. Why do the 
parties become better off?  
 
One possible reason is that there is a difference of valuation judgements, given 
the uncertainty about future conditions. A second reason is the suggestion that a 
merged company will be more profitable as a part. Such “synergies” might 
include: introducing superior management into the merged entity; the 
realisation of complementary in production or marketing; the exploitation of  
scale economies and the elimination of duplicative functions; risk-spreading 
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and its favourable consequences for the cost of new capital; a reduction of tax 
obligations through the pooling of losses and the internalisation of capital 
transfers; and the enhancement of monopoly power by consolidating competing 
interests. A third possibility is that those who control the companies seek the 
prestige and monetary rewards associated with managing a large corporate 
empire, whether or not the consolidation adds profits.    
 
We would like to know the consequences of mergers and acquisitions; in  
particular what financial and stock-exchange effects appear after integration.  
 
The research takes two main forms: the analysis of profit, sales, and other data 
generated internally by one or both of merging enterprises; and the analysis of 
external data, such as stock market reactions to events occurring all the time of 
merger or in its aftermath. Much of our research fits the first, more traditional, 
paradigm. The stock price approach has been widely adopted since 1974. In our 
opinion, both methodologies have strengths and weaknesses. 
 
 
Stock Market Studies 
 
 
Stock market analyses, which also called “event” studies, view the 
announcement of a merger as an “event” in the stock price history of the 
merging companies. When the merger and its accompanying premium are 
announced, the target’s stock prices rise sharply so that, on average, acquired 
firm shareholders realise “abnormal returns” of 10 to 50 percent relative to 
month-before-announcement data price levels (and rising on average since the 
1950s). If the merger occurs, of course, the acquired company’s stock 
disappears. If the merger falls through, there is a tendency for the target’s stock 
prices to drift downward again. 
 
The sharp merged firm stock price increases occurring when the merger is 
announced have two complementary explanations. First, the stockholders who 
hold a company’s stock at any moment in time are plainly those whose 
valuation of the stock exceeds the prevailing market price. If this was not true, 
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they would sell.  To induce the majority to sell, a premium, often sizeable, must 
be offered. Negative target firm abnormal returns in the pre-merger period are 
viewed as evidence of managerial inefficiency: either the target’s management 
has lost its grip, or it had deliberately chosen to stay from the path of profit 
maximisation. After the merger, the sluggardly managers will be replaced by 
more effective leaders, or firm policies will be modified in a profit-maximising 
direction. Also, premiums may be warranted because “synergies” will be 
realised between the merger partners, reducing operating, financing, or tax 
costs and/or raising product prices. 
 
 
Critique 
 
 
One difficulty with the view that stock market value increases reflects 
efficiency increases is that an alternative set of hypotheses can also explain the 
stock price patterns associated with merger events. It says that at any moment 
in time some companies are undervalued by the stock market, while others are 
overvalued. Companies with undervalued stock – that is, inappropriately 
negative cumulative abnormal returns – are “bargains”. Hence, they become 
prime targets for acquisition, perhaps (in stock-for-stock exchanges) by 
companies possessing the uniquely economical currency of overvalued stock. 
In other words, the depression of merged forms’ cumulative abnormal returns 
before the merger event is the result of mistakes by the stock market, not 
mistakes by managers who have failed to maximize profits. The premium paid 
then reflects not the expectation of enhanced future operating efficiency, but 
the difference between the bargain price at which the target firm’s stock is 
selling before the merger and the price that would have to be paid in a 
competitive market recognizing the target’s true value. 
 
Event study supporters vigorously contest this interpretation, arguing that it is 
inconsistent with the assumption of “efficient” stock markets. An efficient 
market is one in which securities prices continually reflect all the information 
available on future earnings prospects and macro-economic conditions. If they 
do not, it is said, those who possess unaccounted for information will be able to 
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make profitable trades, driving prices to a level at which all relevant and 
available information is impounded. 
 
A variety of objections have been raised to the assumption of stock market 
efficiency. For one, even in its strongest form, it does not imply that stock 
market reactions are necessarily correct in their predictions of merger 
consequences, but only that the best available information is impounded. If that 
information is faulty, for example because new merger strategies are being tried 
and investors have not been able to observe their effects sufficiently, the 
market’s predictions may turn out to be erroneous after the fact. 
 
Various anomalies inconsistent with the efficient markets assumption have 
come to light. For merger analysis, the most important are the tendency for the 
shares of companies with low stock price/earnings ratios to perform abnormally 
well, and evidence that acquiring form share values exhibit negative cumulative 
abnormal returns when post-merger periods of more that a few weeks are 
examined. However, the reliability of the latter findings is questionable, since 
the statistical power of stock price analyses deteriorates as one- to three time 
frames are considered. 
 
Even if the assumption of stock market efficiency were true, which is 
singularly difficult to prove or disprove, it’s truth would not preclude the 
possibility that merger activity is driven by a (perhaps mistaken) belief that 
undervalued assets do exist and can be exploited. There is much evidence from 
interviews and “how to do it” tracts suggesting that merger-makers do actively 
seek undervalued targets. There is also a paradox: if analysts and merger-
makers did not allocate substantial resources to finding undervalued stocks, the 
quantity of information on the basis of which markets reach their “efficient” 
equilibrium would be much smaller. Thus, the under-valuation theory cannot be 
ruled out either logically or factually. 
 
These difficulties demonstrate the need for research on the links between 
merger activity and efficiency gains outside the framework of the efficient 
markets theory. Developing evidence on the actual profitability consequences 
of merger is a major objective of the research reported here.    
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Using Financial Accounting Data 
 
Our basic objective is to learn what actually happened after the mergers, both 
generally and in the substantial split of cases where mergers ended in 
divestiture. We seek, in particular, to determine whether mergers on average  
were followed by profitability increases, as suggested by stock market event 
study interpretations. Previous merger profitability studies show that they have 
labored under a lot of difficulties. 
 
One set of problems involves the counterfactual question: what would have 
happened to profits without the merger? Such questions can never be answered 
with certainty, for history can not be changed. In the quantitative work on 
mergers economists have tried to deal with the problem by comparing merged 
entities’ profit performance with that of control groups. They have been of two 
main kinds: before-and-after comparisons; and comparisons with units that had 
no merger but were similar in size, industry, etc. 
 
A serious obstacle to before-and-after analyses is that, once merger occurs, the 
premerged entity disappears into the consolidated accounts. Confining the 
analysis to relatively large mergers is not a reliable solution for there are 
systematic profitability differences associated with merged entity size. 
Moreover, it is difficult to establish a control group of companies with similar 
industrial orientation but which are not involved in a merger. 
 
These problems can be avoided by analysing post-merger performance at the 
level of individual operating units, or “lines of business”, rather than at the 
whole company level.  
 
Another set of problems comes from the way merger accounting is done. Two 
different methods of accounting for merged assets are used. Under pooling-of-
interests accounting, the assets of the acquired firm are recorded at their pre-
merger book value. If the acquirer pays more (or less) for the assets than their 
book value, the difference is debited (or credited) to the acquirer’s 
stockholders’ equity account. In contrast, under purchase accounting the 
acquired assets are entered at the effective price paid for them. If a premium is 
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paid over the acquired entity’s book value, the acquired assets are “stepped up” 
relative to their pre-merger book values, and/or an addition may be made to the 
acquirer’s “goodwill” account. Plant and equipment value increases attributable 
to purchase accounting premiums are always depreciated in following years, 
and goodwill amortisation is required. 
 
Because of these differences, the post-merger profit performance of purchase 
accounting acquisitions is likely to be systematically different from the 
performance of pooling acquisitions. To the extent that a purchase premium 
over book value has been paid, the denominator of any profit/assets ratios will 
be greater under purchase accounting than under pooling, if all else is equal. If 
purchase accounting premiums are amortised, the numerator of any post-
merger profit ratio will be smaller than that under pooling-of-interests 
accounting. Thus, again assuming that a premium above pre-merger book value 
is paid, both profit/assets and profit/sales ratios will be systematically lower 
under purchase accounting than under pooling accounting, although the 
deviation will be greater for asset-based than sales-based measures. 
 
A related accounting choice bias is partly offsetting, but has similar analytic 
consequences. Purchase accounting depresses reported post-merger returns, the 
more so the larger  the premium of the purchase price over pre-merger book 
value. Aware of this and anxious to show a favourable earnings record to the 
investing public, acquiring companies have tended to prefer pooling accounting 
when they paid large acquisition premiums and use purchase accounting mainly 
for acquisitions with lower (or negative) premiums. Since premiums above 
book value tend to be positively correlated with acquired company profitability, 
and assuming some persistence of profitability over time, this bias again means 
that units treated under purchase accounting are likely to exhibit lower post-
merger profitability than pooling-of-interests acquisitions. 
 
Especially during inflationary or deflationary periods, profit figures are 
sensitive to the choice between LIFO and FIFO inventory accounting methods. 
Standard accounting practice is to write off as a current expense investment in 
research, development, and advertising, whose time horizons can span more 
than a single accounting year. When the “true” profit rate exceeds the rate of 
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growth of such outlays, this practice causes accounting profits to be biased 
upward; the more so the larger the share of total costs the outlays represent. 
When company financial accounts are disaggregated to the level of individual 
operating units, inaccuracies may arise if costs common to multiple units are 
allocated among the units, or if inter-unit transfers are made at non-market 
prices. 
 
That accounting data is imperfect and subject to error does not mean, as some 
critics argue, that they are useless for evaluating questions such as the 
profitability of mergers. If the errors are unsystematic or uncorrelated with the 
phenomenon under investigation, they merely add “noise” to any underlying 
profitability relationships, making them more difficult to detect. To extract such 
relationships from “noisy” data is what statistical technique is all about. More 
serious problems occur when the errors present in accounting data are 
systematically associated with the phenomena analyzed; for example, if more 
merger-prone lines tend to be heavier advertisers, grow more rapidly, or use 
LIFO inventory accounting methods more frequently. Whether or not such 
potential biasing factors exist is an empirical question.  
 
We shall see that data has considerable intrinsic plausibility. Concretely, it will 
be able to anticipate or predict important behavioral phenomena with a degree 
of power quite at odds with critics’ claims that the data “are of doubtful value 
for the purposes of economic analysis” or that “there is no way in which one 
can look at accounting rates of return and infer anything about relative 
economic profitability. We are confident that our analysis will demonstrate that 
such objections are ill-founded. 
 
The Accounting Studies 
 
Having studied many theories concerning and explaining the nature of different 
kinds of investments we assume that mergers’ disclosure and assessment can be 
explicated by using a generally accepted theoretical framework for how 
investments, including corporate acquisitions and mergers, should be regarded, 
and their consequences assessed and evaluated. It is based on the theory of 
capital, which emphasises the value implications for the owner (in the case of a  
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merger – the value implications for the owner of emerging company), and 
according to which value is constituted by the cash flows that the company can 
expect. By assuming that the value of a new firm (after merger) is equal to the 
sum of the composed a merger firms’ values, the value implications of a 
particular deal can be assessed isolated from each firm. Therefore, the 
theoretical approach manifests incremental assessments, where the important 
items are incremental cash flows resulting from the decision made by merged 
firm. They are converted to a present value by a discount rate, which takes into 
consideration the risk of the incremental cash flows and the time value of 
money. 
 
The theoretical approach is primarily for the judgement of practical valuation 
models that are based on cash flows. These models can differ in terms of their 
detailed procedures; while some calculate the equity value directly (referred to 
as the “equity approach” to corporate valuation), others estimate the equity 
value indirectly (referred to as the “entity approach” to corporate valuation). 
These two kinds of models apply different cash flow definitions. In the equity 
approach, the relevant component is cash flow that is available to the owner; 
while in the entity approach, the important item is the company’s cash flow 
before transactions with its capital providers. Besides being basic to cash-
oriented valuation models, the theoretical framework for company estimation is 
also vital for valuations of models that use; for example, the accounting 
concept of income, since their general consistency with the theoretical 
valuation framework is an important factor when their quality is assessed. 
 
The theoretical approach to corporate valuation is illustrated as the ideal 
research method9 (Halpern, 1983; Mueller, 1987); but in our opinion, it doesn’t 
seem to have been adopted empirically. The issue of separation is certainly one 
explanation for it, but in research other reasons can also be determined. These 
include difficulties in accessing the necessary internal company data, and 
circumstances that impede statistical inferences regarding the success or failure 
of mergers. Instead previous studies have predominantly used aggregated data 
relating to the entire company. By comparing merging samples that have 
                                                 
9 Halpern, P., (1983), pp.297-317.  
   Mueller, D.C., (1987). 
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experienced mergers and control samples that normally have not, they have 
attempted to distinguish the incremental effects of corporate acquisitions. 
 
 
2.2. Previous Empirical Studies 
 
 
Previous research is made up of three main directions: the accounting studies; 
the market studies; and the interview studies. We consider the accounting 
approach to be more important than the others, because it is directly connected 
to the merger’s outcomes.  
 
We noticed that researchers in previous studies paid more attention to analysing 
the market studies than the other two approaches. The main question in the 
accounting approach is “Are mergers successful or unsuccessful?” In context 
with this there is a necessity to define terms of success and failure. The 
accounting approach has usually measured the outcome of company on the 
consolidation level. Success means that the merged company performs better 
than the parties would have done without merger. Failure is when the opposite 
occurs. 
 
The history of merger activity is one of failure rather than success. “Study after 
study has shown that two out of every three deals have not worked” (The 
Economist, January 1999). One year after deal completion, “… 83% of mergers 
were unsuccessful in producing any business benefit as regards shareholder 
value” (KPMG, 1999b). 
 
Numerous studies indicate that most mergers fail to fulfil management 
expectations. A few of these studies, along with their primary conclusions, are 
cited below.  
 
 
I. Table “Merger & Acquisition Performance. Various Companies and 
Industries, 1960s to 1990s”. 
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Max M. Habeck, et al 
A.T. Kearney 
1993-1996, 115 firms 
 
 
58% of mergers “fail to create value for share-
holders.” 
 
Within four years, 50% of alliances are deemed 
failures. 
 
After three years, profitability of combined 
companies drops by an average of 10%. 
Kenneth W. Smith, et 
al 
Mercer Management 
Consulting 
1980s and 1990s,  
340 firms 
In the 1990s, 48% of deals failed to outperform 
their industries 3 years after consummation. 
 
In the 1980s, 57% of deals failed to outperform 
their industries 3 years after consummation 
Michael Hitt, et al 
Academy of 
Management 
Journal 
1990-1991, 250 firms 
Found no correlation, on average, between 
acquisition intensity and financial performance 
relative to industry, as measured by ROE, ROA 
and profit margin. 
 
Tom Copeland , et al 
 
 
 
In an analysis of 116 acquisitions, 61% failed to 
earn their cost of capital, or better, on funds  
invested in the merger.  
Acquisition Horizons 
1980s 
 
40% of all companies viewed their M&A activity
as “somewhat successful” or “unsuccessful.” 
 
Dennis C. Mueller 
Review of Economics 
and 
Statistics 
 
A majority of mergers and acquisitions have a 
negative impact on market-share, reduce profits 
and produce lower long-term shareholders 
returns. 
 
Michael Fifth 
The Economic Journal 
Debt and losses erode cost savings or increased 
profitability from mergers. 
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A huge amount of research has been dedicated to mergers and acquisitions in 
Western developed countries, especially in the U.S. Previous studies analysing 
stock prices around the announcement of an acquisition (event study method) 
report similar findings: the acquired firms’ shareholders enjoy significant 
positive excess returns, while the acquiring firms’ shareholders receive, at best, 
modest excess returns (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Asquith, 1983; Jarrell, 
Brickley and Netter, 1988). However, empirical studies investigating the 
accounting financial data show inconsistent results. Some find a negative 
impact on the earnings for the merging firms (Hogarty, 1970; Bradford, 1978; 
Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1989), while others report a positive effect on 
profitability for the acquiring firms (Lev and Mandelker, 1972; Smith, 1990) or 
on productivity (Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1990.) The inconsistent accounting 
test results may be due to the different measurement methodology employed 
and different sample selections. 
 
Consolidation has been, for the most part, widespread in the pharmaceutical 
industry, involving some £140 billion of market capitalization (Societe 
Generale Securities, 1999). There are three reasons why drug company mergers 
are so prevalent. First, they offer the opportunity to cut costs through job losses 
and factory closures; second, to extend the scope of the firms’ sales forces; and, 
third, and most important to increase the budget for R&D (The Economist, 
February 1998). Despite these anticipated benefits, the results of merger 
activity in the industry have been mixed. Some time ago, two high-profile 
pharmaceutical company mergers attracted media attention following 
integration difficulties. The SmithKline Beecham and Glaxo Wellcome merger 
initially failed after, “ Original talks between the two companies aimed at 
creating the world’s biggest drug company collapsed because of a clash 
between Glaxo executive chairman, Richard Sykes, and SmithKline chief 
executive, Jan Leschly, over who should run the group” (BBC Online, January 
2000). In January 2000, their union was back on the agenda owing to the 
predicted retirement of the SmithKline chief executive.  
 
Whether the recent wave of mergers and acquisitions in the pharmaceutical 
industry has been successful along different measurements is uncertain at this 
time. Studies of the groups most affected by the merger and acquisition activity 
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– customers, employees, and investors –revealed that the groups differed in 
their estimation of how successful individual mergers and acquisitions have 
been. In depth analysis and perhaps more time are needed to fully assess the 
impact of pharmaceutical industry consolidation.    
 
The determinations of success and failure are based on a comparison, which is 
very complex to utilize in practice. The researchers apply several approaches to 
approximate how the merging parties would have developed in the case of there 
not being merger. The crudest approach is represented by the absolute 
performance studies, where the company’s post merger return is compared to 
the weighted average of the merging parties’ pre-merger return. A more 
complex approach is provided by the relative performance studies, where the 
merger’s performance is compared to that of a control sample.  
 
The accounting studies use different measures of accounting return, such as 
return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA), return on capital employed 
(ROCE) and return on sales (ROS). These accounting ratios describe different 
aspects of profitability. ROE measures the return from the shareholders’ 
perspective; ROA, ROS and ROCE measure the operative profitability.             
 
Absolute Performance Studies 
 
The definition of absolute performance studies is given above and can be 
expressed by formula: 
 
Pm (c) = Pm(b) – Pm(a)  10 
 
 
Where Pm (b) is the merger’s average performance during the applied 
postmerger period; 
             
           Pm (a) is the parties’ average performance during the applied premerger 
period;   
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           Pm(c) is the difference between Pm (b) and Pm(a). 
 
The findings of the absolute accounting studies were summarized and presented 
by M. Bild in his research  “Valuation of takeovers”, (1998)11. These studies 
were published earlier, between 1921 and 1986.  
 
II. Table “Summary of the results of absolute performance studies”.11 
 
Study Performance 
measure 
Tendency 
Dewing (1921) Operative profits - 
 
National Industrial Conference Board 
(1929) 
 
ROCE 
 
- 
Singh (1971) ROE - 
 
Ikeda and Doi (1983) 
ROA 
ROE 
+ 
+ 
 
 
McDougall and Round (1986) 
 
ROA 
ROE 
 
0 
- 
 
 
The third column indicates the tendency in the results: (-) means that the 
postmerger return was unsuccessful, (+) represents a positive performance of 
merger during postmerger period, (0) means that there were neither negative 
nor positive tendencies. The general tendency of the results is slightly negative. 
 
Relative Performance Studies 
 
The formulation of how the merger’s absolute average performance is related 
to the absolute average performance of the control sample can be obtained 
through the following expression: 
                                                                                                                                                      
10 Bild, M., (1998), p.141. 
11 Bild, M., (1998), p.142. 
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            Pm (b)     Pm (a)     12  
Pmc = --------- - ---------        ,   
            Pc (b)       Pc (a) 
Where  Pc is the performance of the control sample. 
 
The findings of the previous relative accounting studies are presented in table 
below. 
 
III. Table “Summary of the results of relative performance studies”. 13 
 
Study Performance 
measure 
Tendency 
Livermore (1935) ROE + 
Kelly (1967) ROS - 
Reid (1968) EPS growth to total 
assets 
- 
Hogarty (1970) EPS - 
Singh (1971) ROCE - 
Weston and Mansinghka 
(1971) 
ROA 
ROE 
+ + 
+ + 
 
 
Lev and Mandelker (1972) 
ROA 
ROE 
ROS 
EPS 
+ 
- 
- 
+ 
 
Melicher and Rush (1973) 
ROA 
ROE 
- 
+ 
Utton (1974) ROCE - 
 
Mason and Goudzwaard 
 
ROA 
 
- 
                                                 
12 Bild, M., (1998), p.143. 
13 Bild, M., (1998), p.144. 
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(1976) 
Meeks (1977) ROCE - 
 
Cable et al (1980) 
ROA 
ROE 
ROS 
+ + 
+ + 
+ + 
 
Cosh et al (1980) 
ROCE 
ROE 
ROS 
+ + 
+ + 
+ + 
 
Jenny and Weber (1980) 
ROA 
ROE 
ROS 
- - 
- - 
- - 
Kumps and Wtterwulghne 
(1980) 
ROA 
ROE 
+ + 
+ + 
 
Mueller (1980) 
ROA 
ROE 
ROS 
- - 
+ + 
- - 
 
Peer (1980) 
ROA 
ROE 
ROS 
- - 
- - 
- - 
 
Ryden and Edberg (1980) 
ROA 
ROE 
ROS 
- - 
- - 
- - 
Hoshino (1982) ROA - 
 
Ikeda and Doi (1983) 
ROA 
ROE 
+ 
+ 
Kumar (1984) ROCE - 
McDougall and Round 
(1986) 
ROA 
ROE 
+ 
+ 
 
Some of the reports used two control samples, this is represented by dual signs 
in the last column. All signs have the same meaning as in the previous table. 
No clear tendency can be traced; the number of positive results is slightly 
below the negative number, improvements in the merger’s cash performance 
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and also a positive relation between cash flows and abnormal stock returns 
around the time of merger announcement. 
 
Cash Performance Studies 
 
The methodology of cash performance studies is basically the one of the 
relative accounting studies. The cash performance studies emerge as a latest 
alternative to the absolute and relative performance studies, but it seems that in 
recent years it was not studied broadly, at least we didn’t find any recent 
published works. The main difference between these studies is that the usual 
return measure in the relative accounting studies (that is, a ratio between 
accounting income and accounting capital) is replaced by a cash performance 
measure. In a while, it was defined as the ratio between the operating cash flow 
and the market value of the associated assets, the operating cash flow is 
calculated as earnings before taxes and interest, then plus depreciation.    
 
Some of those who looked at the postmerger cash performance studies were 
Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992)14. In their research work, they find that the 
mergers experienced important perfections in their cash performance relative to 
their industries, and this trend was stronger when the mergers were more 
related.  They also found a strong positive relationship between operating cash 
flows and abnormal stock returns around the time of merger announcements.  
                                                 
14 Healy, P.M. et al, (1992), p.135-175. 
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3. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
COMPANIES IN THE STUDY 
 
In this chapter, we attempt to trace the historical development of the four 
companies under investigation and see how each of them has grown from their 
inception till the occurrence of the merger. We are particularly interested in 
identifying their main products, the stock exchanges on which they are listed, 
and the basis and reasons for the mergers. 
 
 
3.1. History of Astra 
 
Astra began in 1913 as a small pharmaceutical company near Södertälje, south 
of Stockholm. At that time, due to the dependence of Sweden on imports of 
pharmaceuticals from other countries, particularly from Germany and 
Switzerland, Astra's founders, (Adolf Rising, Hans von Euler and Knut 
Sjöberg), were determined to form an effective Swedish competitor to the 
importers in the domestic market.15 The company begun manufacturing its first 
product, Digitotal (digitalis) in 1914. Though many difficulties were 
encountered during World War I, by 1917 Astra made a profit of SEK 148,000 
and employed 200 people. 
 
Astra was nationalised in 1920, but strong criticism of this resulted in its sale in 
1925 to a private consortium consisting of Erik Kistner, Joseph Nachmansson, 
Jacob Wallenberg and Richard Julin for the sum of 1 Swedish Krona. In 1927, 
they recruited Börje Gabrielsson as President and CEO of the company and he 
remained in this position for 30 years. 
 
As the years went by, the company continued to grow, mainly through 
acquisitions. Notable amongst these was the 1942 acquisition of P.G. 
Nordström's pharmaceutical factory in Hässleholm. Also, a central laboratory 
was opened in Södertälje, the largest in Scandinavia at the time. 
 
                                                 
15 www.astrazeneca.com 
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Astra expanded to the USA in 1947, and also set up subsidiaries in the UK, 
Italy, Canada, West Germany, Colombia, Mexico and Australia during the 
same decade. By 1950, due to the strategy of consolidation pursued by the 
company, all non-pharmaceutical operations, with the exception of medical 
devices were sold off. By the time of the merger, the company’s employees 
numbered approximately 17 000, 65 percent of whom were outside of Sweden.  
 
Products 
 
Astra has strong foundations in four areas: cardiovascular medicines, local 
anaesthetics, anti-asthmatic agents, and antibiotics. Among it’s product 
portfolio are many award winning and large-selling products:  
 
• the beta-blocker Seloken (one of the world's ten largest-selling 
pharmaceuticals)  
 
• the award-winning inhaler, Turbuhaler; the vascular selective calcium 
antagonist Plendil (felodipine)  
 
• the acid-pump inhibitor Losec (omeprazole), which has become the 
world's top-selling pharmaceutical (Appendix 1) 
 
• Atacand (candesartan cilexetil), a new angiotensin II type 1 (AT1)-
receptor blocker, for the treatment of hypertension, to further support the 
broad portfolio of cardiovascular drugs. 
 
Stock Exchange Listings 
 
Astra's shares were introduced on the Stockholm Stock Exchange in 1955and 
on the London Stock Exchange in 1985. The company was presented in the 
prospectus as the largest pharmaceutical enterprise in the Nordic region, with 
subsidiaries in about 20 countries. Astra shares were listed on the New York  
Stock exchange in May 1996. 
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3.2. History of Zeneca 
 
Zeneca was formed in 1993 when Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) demerged 
three of its businesses (Pharmaceuticals, Agrochemicals and Specialties) to 
form a separate company.  
 
ICI’s own genesis can be traced to 1856, when an 18-year-old laboratory 
assistant at London University's chemistry school, William Henry Perkins, 
discovered the synthetic mauve known as aniline purple. At 36 years of age, 
Perkins retired and another chemist, Ivan Levenstein, continued his work. By 
1914, Levenstein and his family had built up an international dyestuffs 
business, which occupied 90 acres at Blackley, near Manchester in the UK. 
Just four years later, they were producing 169 products in huge quantities. 
Levenstein Ltd and British Dyes Ltd merged in 1919 to form British Dyestuffs 
Corporation and in 1926, the British Dyestuffs Corporation merged with three 
other companies to form the Dyestuffs Division of ICI.  
 
In the mid-1930s, ICI ventured into pharmaceutical development and during 
the world war, was requested to work on developing some essential drugs. This 
led to the formation of the Imperial Chemicals (Pharmaceuticals) in 1942 to 
handle and develop these drugs. This was the first step towards a fully-fledged  
pharmaceuticals marketing organisation. Pharmaceuticals sales turnover 
amounted to £247,000 in the same year and rose 16-fold during that decade to 
over £4 million.  
 
By the 1990s, ICI Pharmaceuticals employed more than 12,000 people, had 21 
production sites, 150 sales offices around the world, and major research 
laboratories in the USA, France and the UK. Annual pharmaceutical sales 
surpassed the £1.8 billion goal. 
 
Products 
 
Zeneca continued to build on its pharmaceutical inheritance in cardiovascular, 
anti-cancer, anti-infective and anaesthetic medicines. Pharmaceutical Products 
that performed strongly were Zestril, for the treatment of hypertension,  
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congestive heart failure and heart attacks, Zoladex for  
prostate cancer treatment and Diprivan, a leading intravenous anaesthetic. 
Also, the herbicide range - Gramoxone, Fusilade, Surpass and Touchdown  
was in strong demand, and the insecticide, Karate also contributed well. 
 
  
Stock Exchange Listings 
 
Zeneca’s ordinary Shares were listed on the London Stock exchange and other 
major European Stock exchanges. They were also listed in the form of ADSs 
on the New York Stock exchange. 
 
 
3.3. The merger: Astra Zeneca 
 
Astra AB of Sweden and Zeneca Group plc of London officially completed a 
$37 billion merger on April 6th, 1999, to form the company AstraZeneca. The 
merger created one of the world's largest pharmaceutical companies. 
AstraZeneca was expected to be a market leader in five key therapeutic areas: 
gastrointestinal, cardiovascular, respiratory, oncology and anaesthesia.  
 
The stock exchanges in Stockholm, London and New York approved the 
documentation regarding the merger on January 21, 1999, and an international 
prospectus was made available. By 3.00 pm (Stockholm time) and 9.00 am 
(New York time) on 30 March 1999, (being the end of the initial acceptance 
period under the merger offers) valid acceptances had been received in respect 
of 1,289,503,363 Astra A Shares and 290,644,247 B Shares, representing in 
aggregate 96.2 per cent of the total Astra Shares and 96.4 per cent of the total 
voting rights attaching to Astra Shares. 
 
Dealings in the new AstraZeneca shares and American Depositary shares 
commenced on April 6th, 1999 at 9.00am (London time), 10.00am (Stockholm 
time) and 9.30am (New York time) on the London, Stockholm and New York 
Stock Exchanges respectively. Dealings in AstraZeneca shares on April 6th, 
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1999 were cum dividend on the Stockholm and New York Stock Exchanges 
and ex dividend on the London Stock Exchange. On April 7th, 1999 dealings on  
all three Stock Exchanges were ex dividend.  
 
Both shareholder reactions reflected on the stock dealings and remarks from 
the top executives of the merged companies echoed the air of optimism 
surrounding the merger. On the New York Stock Exchange, Astra AB’s shares  
jumped $3 5/8 to $21 7/8 and British counterpart Zeneca Group PLC  rose on 
$4 1/4 to $45 before trading in both stocks was halted at around 1:30 p.m. 
Eastern time. Shortly thereafter, the companies announced that they were in 
"advanced" discussions that could lead to a possible merger. 
 
On the day the merger was announced, Dr Percy Barnevik, Chairman of 
AstraZeneca said "This new company combines the best of two innovative 
companies with strong track records of organic growth and with great 
synergies    together." Dr Tom McKillop, Chief Executive of AstraZeneca PLC 
remarked,  "Today marks the formation of a new company in the world 
pharmaceuticals market. I am determined that the energy, thoroughness and co-
operation which has enabled the new company to be created in such good time 
will now be devoted to ensuring that AstraZeneca builds further on its platform  
for  growth." 
 
 
3.4. Reasons for the Merger 
 
The main reasons advanced for the merger can be discussed under the 
following main headings: 
 
• Research and development costs 
 
The cost of getting a drug to market had risen sharply as competition 
intensified and companies were forced to rush out remedies as soon as 
possible. The average bill for producing a product was $500m. By pooling 
resources the two companies hoped to create a research and development 
powerhouse.  
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• Patent problems  
 
The patent on Astra’s main money maker, anti-ulcer drug Losec, expires in 
2001. Similarly Zeneca stood to lose the exclusive rights over some of its main 
pharmaceutical products over the next few years. When drugs come off patent, 
competitors usually come into the market, pushing down prices and taking a 
big chunk of sales.  
 
Concerns had been raised about the future prosperity of both companies. By 
combining forces they hoped to cover the cracks in their product pipelines.  
 
• Cost savings  
 
By merging, the two companies hoped to save $1.1bn. Most of the savings 
were expected to come from slashing 6,000 jobs, and combining their 
marketing and research and development functions.  
 
• Intense competition  
 
Analysts criticised Zeneca and Astra for having unambitious management 
teams, which are slow to grasp the changes sweeping across the industry. This 
was because other groups have joined forces and grown much stronger, leaving 
Zeneca and Astra behind.  
 
Pressure from shareholders for action and a desire to compete more effectively 
in the crucial US pharmaceutical market helped prompt the move. The new 
group expected to have nearly half its sales in the US, and half in Europe.  
 
• Good fit  
 
The companies appeared to be a good fit. They had complementary drugs, with 
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few remedies in direct competition with each other. Their similarity in size also 
helped facilitate the merger.16 
 
It was expected that the combined company would support Zeneca's stable of 
cancer treatments, led by Zestril, and Astra's well-established Losic ulcer 
franchise, which is marketed as Prilosic in the U.S. and accounted for about 
55% of Astra's Q3 sales in 1998.17 
 
 
3.5. History of Pharmacia 
 
The roots of Pharmacia AB can be traced back almost one hundred and fifty 
years to 1853 when a leading Italian pharmacist, Carlo Erba, started his own 
company, which later became Farmitalia Carlo Erba. This company later united 
with Kabi Pharmacia, which itself began in 1931. These two companies, along 
with Pharmacia Aktiebolag, form the three main points of origin for Pharmacia 
AB, a Swedish-based company.18 
 
Pharmacia grew rapidly and extended its activities. The first subsidiary was 
formed in the USA in 1952. Several years before the merger with Upjohn, 
Pharmacia had 56 subsidiaries in 22 countries, and the total number of 
employees was 20,000. The company maintained very close ties with the 
Upsalla University, which was like its research and development wing. 
 
The company struggled financially for many years, but by 1988, it turned its 
fortunes around and acquired companies in Germany, other parts of 
Scandinavia, and Italy. Around this time, it was ready to introduce a drug for 
the treatment of glaucoma, but it needed a partner to mass market it in the 
United States. Pharmacia was also stymied by distribution troubles in the 
United States. Its biggest drug, the growth hormone Genotropin, faced severe 
price competition, and the company needed to refill its pipeline. An American 
                                                 
16 http://news.bbc.co.uk 
17 http://www.fool.com/EveningNews/1998/EveningNews981208.htm 
18 http://www.sverigeturism.se/smorgasbord/smorgasbord/industry/com/astra.html 
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company could give it access to the world's most profitable prescription drug 
market.  
 
Products 
 
Pharmacia was a pharmaceutical and biotech company with an internationally 
prominent position in many fields. One such product area is its drugs for the 
treatment of cancer, such as breast cancer, prostate cancer, and leukaemia. 
Another business field is growth hormones, for children not growing at a 
normal rate. The company also developed a high-tech system for the diagnosis 
of allergies and anti-smoking treatment in the form of chewing gums, plasters 
and sprays containing nicotine. Pharmacia Biotech was a leading supplier of 
chemicals and systems for biotechnical research and production. Being the one 
among the largest pharmaceutical companies in the world Pharmacia has a 
large and diverse portfolio of marketed products for customers. The company 
has several  business segments, which are: Primary Care (Celebrex, Ambien, 
Detrol/Detrusitol, Vestra, Axert), Hospital Care (Zyvox, Fragmin, Valdecoxib),  
Cancer Care  (Camptosar, Ellence, Aromasin, Celebrex), Endocrine Care 
(Genotropin), Consumer Healthcare (Nicorette, Nicotrol, Rogaine, Regaine). 
Pharmacia's product portfolio also includes products for women's healthcare 
needs (Depo-Provera, Activella, Vagifem, Lunelle) including contraception 
and menopause. Pharmacia is an industry leader in the field of ophthalmology 
(Healon, CeeOn Intraocular Lenses, Xalatan, Xalcom).  
 
 
Stock Exchange Listings 
 
Pharmacia’s ordinary Shares were listed on the New York and Stockholm 
Stock exchanges.  
 
 
3.6. History of Upjohn 
 
William Erastus Upjohn, M.D. and his brother Henry founded the Upjohn 
Company in 1886. At that time, it was called The Upjohn Pill and Granule 
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Company and based in Kalamazoo, Michigan (USA). William Upjohn patented 
a process for making an unbreakable pill, which was so popular that the image 
of a thumb crushing a pill became the trademark of the company. 
 
Two early and extremely successful products were quinine pills to prevent 
malaria and Phenolax wafers, which were the first candy laxative. Upjohn 
remained a family business and, until 1968, its board of directors was 
composed only of family members and employees. The company continued its 
growth throughout the nineteenth century, eventually evolving into an 
innovative, international company.  
 
In 1995, Upjohn's stock price was flagging and it was often rumoured to be an 
acquisition target. The company had a mature product line: patents were about 
to expire on some of its most important drugs (like its anxiety product Xanax). 
Halcion, an insomnia drug, was plagued by safety concerns. Upjohn's CEO at 
the time, thought a friendly merger would revitalise the company by giving it 
access to new markets, while allowing it to retain its core character. 
 
Products 
 
The Upjohn Company produced the following products: Adeflor, Cheracol, 
Cleocin, Lincocin, Trobicin, Cortef, Medrol, Solu-cortef, Solu-medrol, E-
mycin, Kao-Pectate, Motrin, Neo-cortef, Orinase, Tolinase, Panmycin, Pensyn, 
Unicaps, Viticillinvk, Zymacaps.  
 
Upjohn also manufactured Act-dione, Albacilin, Atgam, Biodry, Botran 
(DCNA), Cortaid, Cytosar-U, Delta Albaplex, Deltasone, Depoprovera, 
Didrex, Enide, Florone, Gelfoam, Halcion, Halotestin, Hylorel, Lincomix, L-S-
50, Loniten, Lutalyse, Maolate, MGA, Micronase, Mycitracin, Pamine, Parvex 
Plus, Predef 2X, Provera, Sigtab, Solu-B, Special Formula 17900 Forte, 
Unipet, Xanax, Zanosar. Various veterinary drugs for use in treating animals 
were also part of their product portfolio.  
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Stock Exchange Listings 
 
The Upjohn Common Stock was listed on the NYSE. As of September 
14,1995, there were 44,919 holders of record of Upjohn Common Stock. 
 
 
3.7. The merger: PharmaciaUpjohn 
 
In 1995, the US giant Upjohn and the Swedish company Pharmacia announced 
plans to merge on a 50/50 basis in a $6.8 billion deal. The announcement came 
two days after Rhone-Poulenc Rorer launched a hostile bid for the British 
Fisons company. At the time, the Swedish government owned 14 percent of 
Pharmacia.  
 
Pharmacia & Upjohn Inc. became one of the 5 biggest pharmaceutical 
companies in Europe, one of the 15 biggest in North America and one of 20 
biggest in Japan. It is also counted among the ten biggest pharmaceutical 
companies in the World and had about 34 000 employees, with around $7 
billion in annual sales envisaged at its inception.  
 
The new company headquarters was to be in London. The first CEO was an 
American (John Zabriskie), and the chairman, a Swede (Jan Ekberg). 16-
member board was comprised of an equal number of Swedes and Americans.  
 
The company became a global provider of human healthcare products, animal 
health products, diagnostics and specialty products. In 1998, Pharmacia & 
Upjohn relocated its global headquarters from the United Kingdom to the 
United States (New Jersey). In September 1999, the company established its 
global headquarters on a 70-acre campus in Peapack, New Jersey. This site is 
now the management and pharmaceutical headquarters for Pharmacia 
Corporation.  
 
The merger was accounted for as a pooling of interests under U.S. generally 
accepted accounting principles. All data prior to the November 2, 1995 merger 
date has been combined as if the companies had been merged during the prior 
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periods. When comparing the results of the new company’s activity for the 
years preceding the merger and merger year 1995, the merger and restructuring 
costs should be taken into consideration. In 1995, the costs for restructuring 
totalled MUSD 103.4 (or USD 0.13 per share) and costs for merger were 
MUSD 138.2 (or USD 0.42 per share). Company’s sales raised as well.        
 
Pharmacia & Upjohn has its primary listing on the New York Stock Exchange, 
as well as a listing on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. The company is 
incorporated in the State of Delaware. U.S. GAAP (Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles) rules apply to the accounts. 
 
Pharmacia has recently expressed interest in developing innovative 
immunological products for cancer.  
 
3.8. Reasons for the Merger 
 
The main reasons advanced for the merger were to strengthen research and 
development, get a wider range of products, strengthen the market organization 
and increase the market share. The combination sought to take advantage of 
certain synergies between Pharmacia and Upjohn in fundamental research, 
product development, manufacturing, sales, and marketing, in order to both  
increase the Company's combined revenues and reduce its costs. The goal of 
the new company, PharmaciaUpjohn, was not just to share product lines and 
sales forces but also to cut costs. One of the first tasks of the new company was 
to lay off 4,000 workers. 
 
Though Pharmacia was in better financial shape than Upjohn, it’s management 
believed a merger with Upjohn would leverage the two companies' 
complementary research strengths — Upjohn was strong in infectious diseases, 
Pharmacia in cancer.19 The two companies complemented each other. While 
Pharmacia had a good supply of new drugs under development, Upjohn's 
medicine chest was understocked with new products. Upjohn was strong in 
marketing in the U.S., whereas Pharmacia was weak. 20 
                                                 
19 http://www.strategy-business.com 
20 http://www.time.com/time 
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One of the focuses of the new company was to be anticancer drugs.21 “For its 
part, the Scandinavian group brings new products to the party - particularly in 
cancer care”, according to the Financial Times of 8/21/95.  
                                                 
21 Moss, R.W., (1995) 
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4. ANALYSIS  
 
This chapter reviews the two companies’ financial performance over the 5 
years before the merger and then up to 5 years following (depending on the 
availability of data). In order to examine the medium-to-long term merger 
effect, we assume that the firm’s financial data must consist of not less than 
four years before the merger is completed, and four years after the merger. For 
the Pharmacia/Upjohn merger, we did not include  the year 2000 because of the 
merger of Pharmacia&Upjohn with Monsanto and related data distortion. The 
chapter also attempts to identify specific measurements of performance that 
will be appropriate for these companies. These analyses will be based on 
graphs, financial ratios and analysis of changes in key figures.  
 
Comparing the postmerger performance with the premerger performance 
provides a measure of the change in corporate performance. We do not exclude 
the possibility that some of the differences between the premerger and 
postmerger performance may be due to economy-wide and industry factors. 
Furthermore, we do not affirm that we restricted premerger  financial data only 
to the real companies’ ones, since the mergers and acquisitions were executed 
continuously (in the case of Pharmacia, they made the following mergers and 
acquisitions: FICE in 1993, Amersham Life Science in 1997), that had 
consequences on performance indicators.   
 
 
4.1. Financial and Operational Review 
 
In analysing the companies’ operations, we thought it would be good to look at 
several things, rather than just concentrating on profit and loss figures, which 
can be misleading in any set of accounts.  We decided to look at the trends of 
various  key indicators that we believe present a clearer picture of a company's 
health. We make use of graphs, since they help to see  clearly what the trends 
are, and give a more accurate view of any company.  
 
 39  
Sales Growth and Other Key Indicators 
 
 
Astra, Zeneca and AstraZeneca 
 
 
Below we make a graphical presentation of sales of the individual companies 
and the merged entities for the years ended 1994 to 2000. We analyse the 
companies’ sales because that is the main source of revenue from which 
shareholders could expect to be paid dividends.Also, it is difficult to 
manipulate or change the turnover or income of a company. When evaluating 
stocks, revenue growth is often an indication of how healthy a company is, 
though sometimes acquisitions and divestitures skew revenue growth figures. 
Zeneca’s historical sales for 1996-1998 amounted to £5630, £5940 and 
£5,510M. When converted at the exchange rate as at December 1996 to 1998 of 
USD 1.6639, 1.6597 and 1.6708 respectively to the British pound (exchange 
rates at respective year-ends) gives figures of  $9368, $9859 and $9206 
(million) respectively.  
 
In 1998, profit before tax and exceptional items of £1.097 billion was achieved 
on sales of £5.5 billion, compared with £1.083 billion and £5.9 billion in 1997 
and £1.043 on £ 5.6 for 1996. The company suffers from adverse effects 
resulting from the strength of the pound sterling. Though these adverse effects 
are noted to have been reduced, it continued to impact reported results. 
Expressed in constant currency, in 1998 Zeneca's profit before tax and 
exceptional items grew by 10% from sales which increased by 10%. In the 
period under review, Zeneca performance showed an improving trend. 
 
As shown by the graph below, Astra’s sales also show increases in these 
periods, from $3,773 million in 1994 to $7,085 million in 1998. Sales increases 
were 28% in 1995, 9% in 1996, 15% in 1997, 27% in 1998, resulting in an 
average increase of approximately 20% during the five years prior to the 
merger.  
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AstraZeneca’s sales for the year ending December 31, 1999 were $18,445 
million (from both continuing and discontinued operations) and $15,134 
million from only continuing operations. This represented an increase of 9%. 
Sales for 2000 were $18,103, $15,804 of which were from continuing 
operations. (The specialities business was discontinued). Despite the slight 
decrease in sales in 1999, we think that sales were maintained to say the least, 
taking into consideration the fact that during 1999 and 2000, the company 
pruned off some of its businesses. AstraZeneca sold out the majority of its 
specialities business and demerged the Agrochemical business in 2000, to leave 
the company positioned as a pure health-care company with a primary focus on 
pharmaceuticals.  
 
The historical sales figures of both companies (from both continuing and 
discontinued operations) were consolidated in their new reporting currency and 
showed a growth from $9,202M in 1997, $11,318M in 1998, $15,134M in 
1999 and $15,804M for 2000, while operating profits were $2,350M for 1997, 
$2,546M in 1998, $3,570M in 1999 and $3,984M in 2000. The group’s 
operating profit before exceptional items was $3,908 million for 1999, an 
increase of 12% and $4,330M for 2000, representing a 13% increase. The 
operating expenses incurred compared to total sales showed that sales grew at a 
faster rate than operating expenses grew. This was seen as an indication of 
efficiency in the use of resources.   
 
The group incurred exceptional costs of $892 million, comprising $864M for 
its integration and synergy programme and $28M rationalisation cost for US 
Astra operations. Synergy and integration costs in 2000 were $322M, bringing 
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the total thus far to $1186M.  Cost synergy envisaged at the inception of the 
merger amounted to $1.1billion, expected to be realised by the end of 2001. 
Cost savings of $130 M were delivered in 1999, as against the target of $100M. 
There were also merger costs of $1,013M charged against profits before tax in 
1999.  
 
The stock to sales ratio of a company is a key indicator and expected to show a 
reduction in the amount of stock supporting sales over the period. For Astra, 
this ratio was 11 times in 1994, 13 for both 1995 and 1996 but decreased to 12 
in 1997 and even further to 10 in 1998. After the merger, it was reduced to 7 
times.  
 
Research and development is the lifeblood of any pharmaceutical company and 
in line with this importance, the companies’ investments in this area have 
grown over the years. This was one of the key reasons for the merger.  
 
Relation between net profits, operating expenses and R&D expenses
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Zeneca spent around 260 million dollars annually on research and 
development. One of it’s principal research and development sites was situated 
in Berkshire, northwest of London, England. The Jealott's Hill research Station 
occupies some 250 hectares and employed around 1000 research scientists and 
support staff working on a wide range of crop-related projects. 
 
Astra’s research and development over the years underwent extensive 
international expansion. The largest expansion of Astra’s research and 
development in modern times was carried out in 1995 with acquisition of new 
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research facilities in the UK (Astra Charnwood) and USA (Astra Arcus USA). 
As at the end of 1996, it had grown to become a high-grade international 
operation with more than 4,000 employees and a network spanning a large part 
of the globe. It had five major product companies, four in Sweden and one in 
Loughborough, England, plus a smaller preclinical research unit in Rochester, 
New York. In 1999, AstraZeneca’s research investments amounted to $2.5 
billion and in 2000, Pharmaceutical R&D spending totalled $2,616 million, 
17% of pharmaceutical sales. This places it amongst the largest in the industry.  
 
It is also noteworthy that much of the sales growth in the years following the 
merger was derived from new products. The combined company’s annual 
investment in pharmaceutical research and development is  concentrated in 
seven areas of medical need: cardiovascular, central nervous system, 
gastrointestinal, infection, oncology, pain control and anaesthesia, and 
respiratory. The company’s research organisation is globally managed, 
employing 10,000 staff at eight major sites in North America, Sweden and UK. 
Research and development expenditure is charged against revenue in the years 
the expenditure is made. 
 
 
Pharmacia, Upjohn and PharmaciaUpjohn  
 
 
During 1992-1993 the company reported optimistic results from financial 
activity. However, as mentioned earlier, some acquisitions or divestitures could 
bias growth figures.  
 
In 1993, Pharmacia merged with Italian Farmatalia Carlo Erba (FICE). During 
that year turnover increased by more than 22%. The upward of turnover was to 
a large degree due to the FICE merger. Japan became the largest market for 
Pharmacia and made up 15% of company’s turnover, followed be the USA, and 
the third was Italy. In 1994, Pharmacia persisted the integration with FICE. 
Sales increased on 3% during 1994.    
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After the merger with American Upjohn, we observe the following increases in 
worldwide sales of 3% in 1996 and 4% in 1995, whereas sales declined 8% in 
1997 to $6.6 billion. Volume growth of 2% was greatly offset by a 1% price 
decrease, a 6% unfavourable exchange rate effect, and a 3% decline due to the 
exclusion of Biotech and Biacore sales from the consolidated total. In 1997, 
sales outside the U.S. represented 68 % of worldwide sales consistent with 
1996 and down from 70% in 1995. The magnitude of sales in Japan and key 
European markets resulted in significant adverse exchange effects to the 
company as the U.S. dollar strengthened relative to the yen and most major 
European currencies throughout 1997. In 1998, Pharmacia&Upjohn could turn 
the decreasing tendency of previous years to increasing one. Sales that reduced 
in 1997 grew by 9,2% during the year 1998. For the year 1999, net sales 
composed an increase of 19,6%. Sales in the USA continued to represent an 
increasingly significant percentage of worldwide sales. 
 
In the graph below we present the assessment of sales-to-earnings-to-R&D 
correlation. As it is illustrated on the graph net earnings were comparatively the 
same during 1991-1994. The year the companies merged, net earnings grew 
almost on 80% measured up to 1994. Afterwards they were falling steadily 
during 1996-1998, and only in 1999 net earnings raised to 1,38 MUSD (change 
in 2,8 times if weigh against 1998). 
 
Even before the merger Pharmacia and Upjohn aimed to direct their research 
and development effort to develop new innovative pharmaceuticals and other 
health care products in a number of therapeutic areas in which the companies 
believed they had ability to establish a leading global position. In Upjohn, total 
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research and development expenditures have been increasing almost every year 
for more than five years, amounting to USD 553,3 million in 1992, USD 612,5 
million in 1993 and USD 607,2 million in 1994. In 1994, this amount presented 
18,5% of total assets, one of the highest rates in the industry. Pharmacia’s 
1992, 1993,  and 1994 research and development expenses were MSEK 1,859, 
MSEK 2,812 and MSEK 3,488, respectively. So, as it visibly demonstrated on 
the graph, both companies’ R&D costs were maintaining constant level till 
merger; after the merger years,  they were increasing continuously.  
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In 1998 and 1999, Pharmacia&Upjohn devoted 15,8% and 17% of its annual 
sales to research and development. Earnings declined in 1997 compared with 
the previous two years. The year-to-year earnings comparison is significantly 
affected by the restructuring of the company since 1995. 
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The restructuring costs were inevitable to transform the company from two 
unique operations into an effective, well-integrated global enterprise. 
Restructuring charges were $316 million ($.39 per share) in 1997; $518 million 
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($.62 per share) in 1996; and $104 million ($.13 per share) in 1995. 
Restructuring charges in 1997 were associated with the global turnaround 
program designed to achieve simplified infrastructure and improved efficiency. 
In 1996 and 1995, the company reduced 4,350 positions in order to eliminate 
the duplicate facilities, and other activities associated with the merger. 
 
In addition, merger costs of $67 million ($.09 per share) were reported in 1996 
and $138 million ($.22 per share) in 1995. These costs consisted of certain 
nonrecurring organizational activities, establishing the corporate identity for the 
new company, and other costs of combining the two predecessor companies. 
Changes in ownership of non-core businesses also have materially affected the 
year-to-year earnings comparison. 
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Conclusions 
 
The postmerger sales and earnings grew for the both mergers, compared to 
premerger sales. As at 1999, AstraZeneca was rated second among the top 15 
pharmaceutical companies’ sales of medicines in  the world (Appendix 3).  
 
However, it is our opinion that the companies did not achieve substantial 
growth in operating income, and consequently in net earnings. As it is clearly 
seen in the graphs above, the postmerger income growth continues though it 
lacks significance. Both mergers, however led to vast expenses. Thus the 
increasing affinity in operating expenses in postmerger period was constructed 
by the merger restructuring costs.     
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Capital Structure  
 
 
Astra, Zeneca and AstraZeneca 
 
Astra’s shares are of two classes, the class A and the class B. Each A-share is 
entitled to one vote and the B-share is entitled to one tenth of a vote. Both 
shares are the same in all other respects and had a par value of SEK 2.50 each.  
 
 
At the end of 1995, Astra had approximately 91,500 stockholders. Foreign 
ownership in Astra at the end of that period accounted for about 47% of the 
capital and 43% of voting rights.  
 
The number of shareholders has increased to 115,000 with 47% foreign 
ownership and 44% of voting rights by December 1996. The Board of 
Directors proposed a stock dividend of 1 share for each 3 shares held and a 
stock split of 2 to 1 in 1997. This was approved by shareholders, thereby 
reducing the par value of all the company’s shares from SEK 2,50 to SEK 1,25 
each.  
 
At the end of 1997, Astra had approximately 243,600 stockholders and foreign 
ownership reduced to 42% and about 40% of voting rights. The year 1998 saw 
even further reduction in foreign ownership and voting rights. The number of 
shareholders increased to approximately 256,400 while foreign ownership was 
reduced further to 39% foreign ownership vis-a-vis 38% of votes. 
 
 
The following tables and graphs show a simplified picture of the financial  
structure of Zeneca, Astra and AstraZeneca for 1994 to 1998 through to 2000. 
The models explain the relationship between the balance sheet items, and can 
be used as a tool to assess the financial position. 
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Zeneca had more debt compared to equity than Astra. We would have liked to 
analyse the make of it’s equity to determine the level of retention but didn’t 
have access to that information.  
 
The greater proportion of Astra’s capital was from retained earnings. 
Shareholders equity for the year 1994 to 1998 were 1,541 MSEK and increased  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to 2,054MSEK in 1997. The company has a high retention ratio and most of its 
growth is financed from this. Almost three quarters of it’s shareholder equity is 
from retained gains (self-generation). Prior to the merger, Astra had a very 
small proportion of long term liabilities. 
 
AstraZeneca had net funds of $2169M as of 31 December 1999, and a gearing 
of nil. In 1999, 826 million shares of the merged company were issued to Astra 
AB shareholder and a further 3 million in respect of share options. The group 
also embarked on a share buy-back scheme and had repurchased 4, 338,444 
shares by the end of the year, making the total number of shares in issue  
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1,775,067,825. Group reserves were reduced by $630M due to exchange rate 
movements and shareholders funds reduced by a net of $627M to $10,302M.   
 
In 2000, the company had net funds of $3,605M as of 31 December. 
Repurchased shares numbered 9.4 million, costing $353 M. This brought the 
total number of repurchased shares to 13.7 million at a cumulative cost of $536 
M. Shareholders funds were reduced by a net of $781 M to $9521 M at the end 
of the year. 
 
The UK or US applicable accounting standards adopted are not expected to 
have material impact on the company’s financial position and results. 
 
 
 
Pharmacia, Upjohn and PharmaciaUpjohn 
 
To provide the readers with a very clear image of Pharmacia&Upjohn’s capital 
structure, we apply the next graphs (see below) and tables (see Appendix 6).  
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The assets grew significantly, primarily due to merger related consolidations. 
As indicated below, net financial assets have remained relatively constant from 
1995 through 1997, increasing slightly each year. The company’s liabilities, to 
some extent, repeat the dynamic of assets’ changes. They raised due to the 
merger spending from 1995 till 1999.  
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The shareholders capital has risen quite a lot. That can be explained by the 
merger event, when the share capitals of both companies were combined and 
issued additionally more shares.  
 
 
 
Financial Ratios 
 
 
It is only by applying these ratios that investors can be sure of a company's 
financial stability or otherwise. Des Luplau, a leading financial consultant and 
author of several books on analyzing company accounts, says the ability to 
interpret ratios can give investors the opportunity to forecast a company's 
earnings and profitability.  
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Current Ratio 
 
One of the most widely used tests of a company's financial strength is the 
current ratio calculated by dividing its current assets divided by its current 
liabilities. This measures the theoretical ability of a company to repay its short-
term debts in a hurry if it is in trouble. Most pundits claim that a ratio of 2.0 
(twice as many current assets as current liabilities) is a good benchmark, but it 
depends on the business. High-growth companies, however, need a larger 
cushion to finance rapid expansion, while big, established firms can get away 
with less. 
 
 
Astra and AstraZeneca 
 
The graph shows that this ratio ranged between 2,1 times and 3,8 in the periods 
before the merger and 1,7 and 1,7 times after the companies merged. The more 
important issue is to take a look at the ratio trend over time. A low, but stable 
current ratio is less of a problem than a sharply declining ratio that might  
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signal either unsustainable growth or a deteriorating business. Both conditions 
are serious red flags for any investor. Based on just time ratio, we can not draw 
many conclusions, so we find it useful to compare with Pharmacia’s ratios. The 
higher the ratio, the more liquid the company. The bigger the excess of assets 
over liabilities, the better for creditors, especially if the value of inventories 
were to decline.  
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PharmaciaUpjohn 
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 merger, the ratio was rather stable 
and hesitated between 1.3 and 2 
times, the decreasing trend in current 
ratio examination can be observed 
from the merger up untill 1997. This 
decreasing can be explained by  
declines in receivables and short-
erm investments. At year-end 1998 and in 1999, the company’s current ratio 
as generally constant and consisted of around 1,5 times. Generally, the 
ompany was liquid enough before and after the merger. 
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e perceive a significant change of current ratio in  AstraZeneca case from 
remerger to postmerger periods. The current ratio decreased radically the year 
efore the merger and during the following postmerger years. However, for 
harmaciaUpjohn the change in current ratio was insignificant. The trivial 
ownward change in liquidity (CR) during first two years after merger was 
oticed but with almost no difference in leverage (DE).  
Debt –To-Equity Ratio 
ividing the amount of long-term debt of a firm by its shareholder's equity 
ields the debt-to-equity ratio, which gives some insight into how the firm is 
apitalised. Because interest payments on bonds are tax deductible to the 
orporation while dividends to shareholders are fully taxed, companies have an 
ncentive to carry at least some debt on their books. However, getting 
verloaded with debt reduces management's flexibility and increases the risk to 
hareholders. 
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Astra and AstraZeneca 
 
Astra, as the graph depicts, used a very small proportion of debt finance its 
assets, compared with equity. This lower debt/equity ratio generally means that 
a company has been aggressive in financing its growth with equity, which can  
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explain its stable earnings. 
 
The basic belief is that it's not prudent to owe more than you own. After the 
merger, the combined company’s debt to equity ratio increased, especially in 
1999 when it was 1.03, but reduced to 0,93 in 2000. 
 
PharmaciaUpjohn 
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capitalization increased over 1996-1997 due to a decline in shareholders’ 
equity. The negative currency translation adjustments recorded in equity caused 
much of this decline coupled with lower 1997 earnings levels. The increase in 
the  percentage of debt to total capitalization from 1997 to 1999 reflects 
growing debt levels.  
 
Conclusions 
 
We found a huge upward direction for DE ratio for AstraZeneca in postmerger 
period, and a rather big enlargement of liabilities in postmerger period for both 
companies.  
 
 
Return On Equity 
 
A measure of a corporation's profitability, calculated as dividing net income by 
shareholders equity, is useful for comparing the return on equity compared to 
other firms in the same industry. This is one of the most important ratios for  
determining if the shareholders get enough profits to compensate for the risks 
in investing in the company.  
 
 
Astra and AstraZeneca 
 
A turnaround is noticeable in the sense that the ratio seemed to be declining 
over the years before the merger, but started to rise after the merger.  
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PharmaciaUpjohn 
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Return on Equity(ROE) :  ROE over the past 10 years gives us a very good idea 
of the historical growth.  
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From the year prior the merger and the years followed it, ROE felled 
significantly (from 20% in 1994 to 5% in 1997). After 1997, the rising 
propensity is observed.   
 
Return on Assets:-  This is considered a measure of how effectively assets are 
used to generate a return. Year to year trends may be a good indicator, but 
changes in the total asset figures (a decrease or increase in the denominator) 
can effect the ratio and doesn't necessarily mean the business is improving or 
declining. Hence, we perceive that ROA is falling during the years 1994-1997, 
but if we look at the structure of assets during those years we distinguish the 
growth of the current and fixed assets.  
 
Conclusions 
 
ROE and ROA deteriorated in short-term premerger and postmerger  periods 
relative to long-term premerger and postmerger periods for both AstraZeneca 
and PharmaciaUpjohn. As far as ROE, ROA results for both companies gave a 
similar trend, we can conclude that profitability measures declined after the 
merger but seemed to turn the trend upwards. 
 
Earnings Per Share 
 
This is measured by net income for a specific period divided by the number of 
outstanding shares. Companies usually use a weighted average number of 
shares outstanding over the reporting term. This is the single most popular 
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variable in dictating a share’s price as it indicates the profitability of a 
company.  
 
Astra and AstraZeneca 
 
The earnings per share of Astra kept improving year after year throughout the 
periods from 1994 to 1998. It was noted, however, that in the postmerger 
period  the increases have been more noteworthy. We are unable to make many 
conclusive assessments on this because if a company issues more shares then 
EPS are much harder to compare to previous years.  
 
PharmaciaUpjohn 
 
If EPS is compared to the EPS from the previous years it indicates the rate of 
growth that a companies earnings are growing on a per share basis.  
 
EPS Analysis: 
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Earnings per share that were falling down up until 1997 when they increased by 
12% in 1998. After a troubled start-up, the company issued a series of profit 
warnings before bringing in a new chief executive. The share price has 
reflected this rocky development, but has risen from a closing low of 219 SEK 
in April 1997. In January, 1998 P&U shares rose sharply and were evaluated at 
437 SEK. On January 4, the Swedish government announced it wanted to sell 
its stake in the company. In the past 12 months, P&U shares have risen 57%.  
 
In November 1998, the company announced a $1 billion stock repurchase 
program. Management expects to complete the program over a two-year period. 
In January 1999, the company repurchased 1.8 million shares for approximately 
$100 million. 
 
The company’s future cash provided by operations and borrowing capacity are 
expected to cover normal operating cash flow needs, planned capital spending, 
dividend pay-ments, and stock repurchases that may be approved by the board 
of directors for the foreseeable future. As of December 31, 1998, lines of credit 
available for company use totalled $1,073 million, of which $500 million are 
committed and $27 million were used as of year end. The company had A-1+ 
and P-1 ratings for its commercial paper and AA- and A1 general bond ratings 
from Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s, respectively, as of December 31, 1998. 
 
 
4.2. Shareholder Value Creation 
 
The creation of shareholder value is believed to be the true measure of a 
company’s success. This is an indication that the company’s products and 
services are valuable to customers and worth rewarding. Returns to 
shareholders accrue in two ways. First, through the appreciation of their stock 
prices and second, through dividends paid out to shareholders. 
 
A public company can measure its success in creating shareholder wealth by 
comparing its market capitalisation at the beginning of a period to its market  
capitalisation at the end of the period. Market capitalisation is calculated by 
multiplying share price by the number of shares outstanding at any given time. 
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It is the total value of the company. If market capitalisation increases over a 
period of time, wealth has been created; if it is negative, then wealth has been 
diminished. We concentrate on share price dynamics instead, in order to avoid 
any distortions caused by new share issues. 
 
Share Information 
 
Astra and AstraZeneca 
 
Both Zeneca’s ordinary shares in issue at the respective year ends and the 
weighted averages for the periods were 946 million in 1994, increasing to 950 
million at the end of 1998. During the same period, the stock price also 
increased to £26.17 (see Appendix 7) at the end of 1998, with the lowest and 
highest prices in the period being  £18.60 and £27.59. Market capitalisation 
was, therefore,  £8,306 in 1994 but had increased to £24,861 by the end of 
1998. Translated into Swedish currency this gives figures of 77,345 MSEK and 
231,505 MSEK respectively. 
 
In Astra’s case, ordinary shares in issue at the end of 1994 and 1995 were 
501,543,100 class A shares and 114,665,736 Class B shares, making up a total 
of 616,208,836 shares.  In 1997,  a Board proposal for a stock dividend of 1 
share for each 3 shares held and a stock split of 2 to 1 was approved by the 
stockholders. Consequently, the par value of all the Company’s shares was 
changed from SEK 2.50 to SEK 1.25 per share in connection with the split. 
Therefore the number of share in issue at the end of both 1997 and 1998 were 
Class A 1,337,448,266 and class B 305,775,296 shares, totaling 1,643,223,562  
 
Please see appendix 7 for the stock price and the lowest and highest prices in 
the period. Market capitalisation was 118 billion SEK in 1994 but had 
increased to 272 billion SEK by the end of 1998. Translated into U.S. dollars, 
this gives figures of and respectively. 
 
Pharmacia 
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Looking at the Pharmacia’s and Upjohn’s share prices as of August 18, 1995 
(the day of merger announcement), and the company’s share prices in the 
postmerger period (please, refer to Appendix 7 for more details) it can be seen 
that the company’s performance is generally improving. Information about 
stock prices prior to this date was unavailable to us. We, however, have 
information on stock price movements within the last two years (i.e. 2000 & 
2001).  
 
 
Dividend Performance 
 
AstraZeneca 
 
Both the Astra and the Zeneca boards had as its long tem goal that the size of 
dividends be geared to the company’s growth in earnings. Analysing the 
dividend growth over the periods under review, we noticed that the Astra’s 
dividends proposed and paid increased from 0,84 SEK to 1,90 SEK, from 1994 
to 1998.   
 
However, Zeneca’s dividend paid over the five years before the merger were 
very much higher  (Appendix 7). The average dividends paid in these five years 
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when converted, amounted to 40 Swedish Kronas. This figure is very high 
when compared to what was paid to the Astra shareholders. Part of the reason 
can be attributed to the strengthening of the pounds sterling and dollar and the 
weakening of the Krona. It must also be borne in mind that Astra had a very 
high retention ratio and financed most of it’s growth and business from this. 
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After the merger, a new dividend policy was announced. This policy, in the 
absence of unforeseen circumstances, anticipated that dividends could be 
maintained at $0,70 per ordinary share until earnings cover dividends by 
between two and three times. Thereafter dividends are intended to be grown in 
line with earnings. Therefore, dividends paid for both years, after the merger, 
were $0.70. In the pre-merger years, the average dividends paid to Astra 
shareholders was 2,59 SEK, but increased to an average of 6,51 SEK (after 
conversion) for the two years following the merger.  
 
 
Pharmacia&Upjohn 
 
Analyzing the dividends paid by companies to their shareholders before the 
merger we again observed a significant dissimilarity in the amounts of 
dividends paid by Upjohn and by Pharmacia. While Pharmacia offered its 
shareholders  payments per share that did not exceed $0,49 USD, Upjohn 
rewarded its investors with approximately $1,48 USD.  
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Dividends paid throughout the postmerger period were also the same amounts – 
$1,08 USD. Therefore, we can conclude that Pharmacia’s shareholders 
benefited from the merger with Upjohn, as they received the increase in 
dividends paid; while Upjohn’s shareholders lost a bit with the decreasing the  
dividend paid. 
 
 
Conclusions 
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Shareholder value is, by definition, a long-term concept that takes into account 
the returns to shareholders (rises in share prices and dividends).  It is driven by 
the strategic success of the company, and also by its operational performance. 
Capital appreciation accumulated in both mergers since the share price of the 
companies’ equities grew on the stock market and dividends paid to their 
shareholders increased, especially for the Swedish companies.  
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5. Final Conclusions  
 
 
In our thesis, merger performance is evaluated in terms of multiple financial 
performance measures. Mergers in chosen cases were undertaken to improve 
economic performance, to respond to the managerial challenge presented by the 
need to integrate, to gain the benefits of synergy and acquire increased market 
share. Economic motives were to be the most important and include pursuing 
market power, increasing profitability, shareholder value and sales, and 
achieving economies of scale.  
 
Measuring merger performance is difficult; standard financial measures in our 
cases gave positive results. There were consistent improvements in both cases. 
However, our study of the historical stock prices and articles indicated that the 
Pharmacia&Upjohn merger had a rather troubled start. The prices of its stock 
went downhill, although this was not reflected in the company’s figures. The 
AstraZeneca merger, on the other hand, saw increases in both company figures 
and stock prices. 
 
 A better measure could, therefore, be the achievement or otherwise of the 
original objectives of the merger. The reasons cited for the mergers were very 
similar in both cases. The study showed that the companies were able to 
achieve an increase in market power, sales and profitability, create additional 
shareholder value and made gains in economies of scale.  
 
AstraZeneca has the second largest research and development budget in the 
industry and realised cost savings in 1999 and 2000. This was, in fact, in excess 
of the estimated figures at the inception of the merger. It’s sales and market 
power has improved and it was noted that the bulk of those increases were 
attributable to new products. Market values have also improved along with 
dividends, especially for the erstwhile Swedish company’s shareholders. We do 
not know how the merger was worked out with Astra’s old shareholders. We 
were able to find out that each Zeneca share was exchanged for one 
AstraZeneca share. 
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After examining the accounting data of performances in each company, the 
conclusion was drawn that there were performance difficulties between merged 
companies. The years following the merger were characterized by a cultural 
dilemma (to a great extent in Pharmacia&Upjohn where the company’s CEO 
had essentially transformed the company's culture into an American one, after 
experiencing many difficulties incorporating the Swedish and American 
company of Pharmacia), rising merger costs (both cases) and managers’ 
disappointment with the progress of integration (especially in 
Pharmacia&Upjohn case). After the merger, both corporations managed to 
increase their sales worldwide but earnings plummeted.  
 
In AstraZeneca’s case, the post merger integration seemed to be smoother. We 
attributed it to cultural issues and human perceptions. It is our opinion that the 
time for preparing the merger may have been too short in the case of 
Pharmacia. We also suspect that the timing of the AstraZeneca merger, at a 
time when more efforts are being made by the Europeans to collaborate with 
each other, may have helped their post merger integration as there may have 
been less resistance to changes. 
 
AstraZeneca PLC shocked the industry by coming out with growth numbers 
that far exceeded expectations. Third-quarter drug sales in the U.S., the world's 
fastest-growing market, soared 60%, to $1.9 billion, and worldwide sales were 
up 31%, to $3.7 billion, compared with the same period last year. AstraZeneca 
increased pre-tax profits by 54%, to $941 million. These results underscore its 
CEO’s argument that AstraZeneca is the one drug megamerger that's working.  
 
Problems Encountered During Our Study 
 
During the course of our study, we encountered certain problems, which we 
believe need to be brought to the reader’s attention. 
 
There was difficulty in communicating with the companies involved. Due in 
part to this and also to time limitation, we were unable to interview those 
stakeholders we would have wished to interview. We also encountered 
difficulties accessing information. For instance we would have liked to know 
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Pharmacia’s and Upjohn’s stock share prices and dividends paid in the 
premerger period, and number of shares of the companies. In AstraZeneca’s 
case, we would have liked to have information regarding the basis on which 
Astra shares were exchanged for AstraZeneca’s, exchange rates at which the 
company’s pre-merger financial data were consolidated and peculiar problems 
associated with post merger integration in both companies. 
 
Comparisons with Previous Research 
 
Unlike the previous research cited, in both cases we found that the mergers 
could be said to be successful, at least when measured against those indicators 
that we chose. We also note that in most of the previous research, however, the 
number of companies studied was greater. 
 
Future Research 
 
We accept that merger success could be measured by more than just the short-
term market prices of stocks and profitability, we recommend further 
investigation of mergers’ results, since performance measurement is many-
sided. 
 
Potential area for further research could be a study that uses a different form of 
accounting scientific approach or combines the applicable approaches in 
literature regarding the financial outcomes of mergers.  
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Appendixes  
 
 
1.    The top 15 pharmaceuticals in the world 1999 (MUSD) 
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Source: www.lif.se 
 
 
2.    Sales in Sweden by the 15 largest pharmaceutical groups of 
companies 1999  
Sales in MSEK at pharmacy purchasing price (AIP), incl. agency sales and 
vet.Glaxo Wellco 
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Source: www.lif.se 
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3.  The top 15 pharmaceutical companies’ sales of medicines in  
the world 1999 (MUSD) 
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 Source: www.lif.se 
  
BMS = Bristol-Myers Squibb                      AHP = American Home Products 
SB = SmithKline Beecham                           J&J = Johnson & Johnson 
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     4.                   Sales  in million USD ($) 
 
 Astra Zeneca AstraZeneca 
1994 3,773 6,980 10,753 
1995 5,392 7,672 13,064 
1996 5,710 9,368 15,078 
1997 5,759 9,859 15,618 
1998 7,085 9,206 16,291 
1999 - - 15,134 
2000 - - 15,804 
 
 
 
 
 Pharmacia Upjohn Pharmacia&Upjohn 
1992 2,654 3,256 5,910 
1993 3,168 3,340 6,507 
1994 3,429 3,275 6,704 
1995 - - 11,152 
1996 - - 12,066 
1997 - - 1,580 
1998 - - 13,737 
1999 - - 16,425 
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5. Relationship between Sales, Net Earnings, Operating Expenses 
and R&D 
(million USD) 
 
            Astra’s                Zeneca’s 
 Operating Net R&D Operating Net R&D 
 Expenses Earnings Expenses Expenses Earnings Expenses
1994 2,690 915 555 3,453 690 807 
1995 3,718 1,320 871 3,703 518 846 
1996 3,920 1,384 1,033 3,895 1,070 1,002 
1997 4,026 1,308 1,122 4,143 1,212 1,084 
1998 5,355 1,462 1,313 3,677 1,193 1,183 
1999 11,704 2,508 2,472    
2000 12,043 2,909 2,620    
       
 
   Astra’s figures in million SEK 
Years Sales Net R&D Stock 
  Earnings Expenses  
1994 28, 030 6, 795 4, 124 2, 468 
1995 35, 800 8, 764 5, 784 2, 793 
1996 38, 988 9, 449 7, 057 2, 993 
1997 44, 904 10, 201 8,, 746 3, 785 
1998 57, 187 11, 803 10, 600 5, 668 
1999 128, 503 21, 295 20, 990 17, 873 
2000 152, 673 28, 102 25, 310 20, 828 
 
Pharmacia&Upjohn (consolidated data) 
      1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Sales 
5910 6507 6704 11152 12066 12580 13737 16425
Net Earnings 692 548 821 1476 944 711 362 1378 
R&D 908 1014 1123 1814 1936 2144 2176 2815 
Operating 
Expenses 1623 1,822 1890 3700 4086 4444 5004 5319 
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6.                        FINANCIAL STRUCTURES 
 
 
Zeneca 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Fixed Assets 2,761 2,996 3,270 3,575 4,546 
Current Assets 4,532 4,849 5,050 4,740 4,493 
Liabilities 4,577 4,819 4,762 4,677 4,785 
Equity 2,716 3,027 3,557 3,638 4,254 
 
 
Astra and AstraZeneca 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Non-Current 
Assets 17 197 21 094 22 994 24 987 36 571 84 078 76 501 
Current 
Assets 18 121 22 621 29 230 37 293 39 567 84 180 101 579
Stockholder's 
Equity 23 301 30 679 38 279 46 015 54 855 87 814 92 180 
Liabilities 12 017 13 036 13 945 16 265 21 283 80 444 85 900 
 
 
                       Pharmacia                             Upjohn 
      1992 1993 1994  1992 1993 1994 
Fixed Assets 
2,604 1,858 1,974 
 
1,646 1,672 2,13 
Current 
Assets 1,163 2,446 2,24 
 
1,596 1,701 1,799 
Liabilities 1,328 1,859 1,312  2,498 2,726 2,78 
Equity 3,54 2,012 2,35  2,005 2,086 2,383 
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Pharmacia&Upjohn (consolidated data) 
      1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Fixed Assets 
7,745 7,769 7,976 9,724 10,682 
Current Assets 11,891 12,122 12,994 16,981 16,512 
Liabilities 9,454 9,875 11,292 16,146 16,283 
Equity 10,182 10,016 9,678 10,559 10,911 
 
7.                    SHARE INFORMATION 
 Zeneca share 
information 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Ordinary Shares in 
issue-millions 
      
At year end  946 947 947 949 950 
Weighted average for 
year 
 946 946 947 948 950 
Stock Market price  
- per 25p Ordinary Share 
Pence Pence Pence Pence Pence 
Highest  898.5 1334.0 1758.5 2265.0 2759.0 
Lowest  674.5 841.5 1227.0 1594.0 1860.0 
At year end  878.5 1246.0 1647.5 2141.0 2617.0 
 
Market cap. 
 at year end 
 
£8,306 
 
£11,799 
 
£15597 
 
£20318 
 
£24861 
(in millions) $12,941 $18,176 $25952 $33722 $41,538 
SEK 77,345,472 109,872,288 145,239,264 189,201,216 231,505,632 
 
 Astra 
share 
information 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
 Shares in 
issue - 
millions 
      
Class A  - 50 1,543,100 501,543,100 1,337,448,266 1,337,448,266
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Class B  - 114,665,736 114,665,736 305,775,296 305,775,296
Total - 616,208,836 616,208,836 1,643,223,562 1,643,223,562
Market price 
(at year end) 
      
Class A  192 265 337 138 166 
Class B  190 263 329 134 165 
 
Market cap. 
 at year end 
     
(in billions SEK) 118 163 207 225 272 
 
 AstraZeneca share information 1999 2000 
Ordinary Shares in issue-millions   
At year end 1,775 1,766 
Weighted average for year 1,776 1,768 
Stock Market price - per $0.25 Ordinary Share   
Highest (pence) 2946 3600 
Lowest (pence) 2208 1926 
At year end (pence) 2568 3375 
 
 
 
8.             Foreign Exchange Rates 
 
Both AstraZeneca and Pharmacia’s reporting before the merger were executed 
in SEK, but after the merger, the merged companies reported in US dollars. To 
facilitate analysis and make financial results analogous and more comparable, 
we converted all figures of the premerger period into USD.  
 
The historical Financial Data for PharmaciaUpjohn have been translated into 
US dollars at a rate of USD 1 = SEK 7,2625 as of June 30, 1995 and for the 
years ended December 31, 1994, 1993, 1992 of USD 1 = SEK 7,7129; 7,8004; 
5,8214, respectively. 
 
For AstraZeneca, we have used respective year-end average exchange rates 
available from shown in the table below. These averages are based on daily 
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noon buying rates for cable transfers in New York City certified for customs 
purposes by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, available from 
www.federalreserve.gov/releases/G5/. 
 
Years British Pound(£) Swedish Krona
1994 1,5580 7,4285 
1995 1,5405 6,6393 
1996 1,6639 6,8283 
1997 1,6597 7,7977 
1998 1,6708 8,0716 
1999 1,6132 8,4910 
2000 1,4629 9,6604 
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